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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the multi-attribute multi-unit procurement mechanism design problem facing a set of 
potential suppliers who suffer from disruption risks. Each supplier’s production cost depends on its disruption 
probability, and both are private information. We propose a Vickery-Clark-Groves auction with disruption 
risk (VCG-DR) for this problem and show that the mechanism is incentive-compatible, individual-rational 
and social efficient. Moreover, we compare the performance of the proposed mechanism and the popular 
single-attribute multi-unit forward auction (SA-MFV) with reserved attribute by numerical experiments. The 
results show that VCG-DR outperforms SA-MFV in both social efficiency and optimality.   
Keywords: multi-attribute reverse auction; supply disruption; mechanism design; VCG auction 
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1. Introduction
During the last decade, we witnessed many disruption events like earthquakes, 
hurricanes, strikes, machine breakdowns and man-made disasters in the world. These 
disruption events cause great loss to supply chains. The increasing disruption risk 
brings large difficulties for managers to choose suppliers when purchasing raw 
2 
materials and components. In addition, the complexity of global supply chain makes it 
difficult for buyers to obtain information from their suppliers. The uncertainty of the 
supply also arises from the producing process itself in some industries, for example, the 
vaccine industry (Cho and Tang, 2013). Under this situation, how to choose efficient 
suppliers facing asymmetric information of supply uncertainty and production cost is an 
important problem faced by procurement managers. 
On the other hand, reverse auction is widely adopted in procurement due to its 
excellent cost saving advantage comparing with other procurement methods (Pham et 
al., 2015). Many companies like HP, Dell and GE are using reverse auction to purchase 
their materials and services (Chen, 2014; Santamaría, 2015; Leu, 2008). However, the 
majority of auctions are price-only, which ignore other attributes other than the cost 
(Beil and Wein, 2003; Pham et al., 2015). This brings criticism to reverse auction since 
it may lead to troubles involving buyer-supplier trust and long-term relationship (Pham 
et al., 2015; Smeltzer & Carr, 2002). Besides, the reverse auction may cause greater 
loss compared with its cost saving when ignoring the non-price attributes such as 
quality, supply risk, etc. since the business is more and more relying on product quality 
and supply efficiency. Thus, the research on multi-attribute reverse auction is 
interesting and important (Pham et al., 2015). 
In this work, we study the procurement mechanism design problem when the 
buyer’s purchase quantity is multi-unit and the potential suppliers have uncertain 
supplies, and the order is dividable. We design a procurement auction to help the buyer 
to select suppliers and allocate the order efficiently among them. We first characterize 
the optimal allocation problem when all information are known. Then we propose a 
Vickrey-Clark-Groves type auction for this problem (we call it VCG-DR auction) and 
show that the mechanism is incentive compatible and individual rational. We generalize 
the concept of social efficiency of a mechanism to the case with supply disruption and 
show that the VCG-DR is efficient. Furthermore, we compared the performance of the 
VCG-DR auction and the popular single-attribute multi-unit forward Vickrey (SA-
MFV) auction with reserved attribute by numerical experiments. The results show that, 
the VCG-DR is more efficient and optimal than the SA-MFV. Comparing with the 
existing literature, this work has the following contributions: (1) We first propose a 
multi-unit efficient procurement mechanism facing supply disruption; (2) We 
characterize the optimal allocation problem when all suppliers may suffer disruption 
events; (3) By numerical experiments, we also demonstrate that the proposed 
mechanism out-performs the popular SA-MFV with reserved attribute both in the social 
welfare and the buyer’s expected profit. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some related 
literature to identify the research gap. We present the problem setting and analyze the 
symmetric case in Section 3. In Section 4, we propose the VCG-DR auction and study 
its properties. We compare the performance of the VCG-DR and the SA-MFV by 
numerical experiments in Section 5. The conclusions are given in Section 6. 
2. Literature Review
In this paper, we study multi-unit multi-attribute efficient procurement mechanism 
design problem facing supply disruption. There are three streams of literature related to 
this study. 
The first stream of literature related to this study is on supply chain risk 
management. In the last decades, since natural and man-made disasters are ubiquitous 
and supply chain risk management has attracted extensive interesting from academy 
and numerous literature have appeared. Fahimnia, et al (2015), Tang (2006), Tang and 
Musa (2011) gave extensive review. The majority of the literature study the managing 
methods and strategies facing unreliable suppliers, e.g. contract menu (Yang et al., 
2009), business insurance (Dong and Tomlin, 2012) and dual sourcing (Huang and Xu, 
2015; Tang, Gurnani and Gupta, 2014; Yang et al, 2012). There are some works 
studying supplier selection and order allocation problem when facing supply 
uncertainty (Federgruen and Yang, 2008; Sawik, 2014). The above works assume that 
the suppliers’ disruption probabilities and production costs are complete information.  
The second stream of literature related to this study is on multi-attribute reverse 
auction. Pham et al. (2015) gave an extensive review. Che (1993) first considered two-
dimensional auctions and used a score function to aggregate price and quality. He 
analyzed the first-score, second score and second-preferred auction, and explored the 
revenue equivalence between them. Based on the work of Che (1993), a lot of 
researches have been conducted to explored the revenue equivalence between different 
auction formats (Branco, 1997; David et al., 2006). The above studies do not consider 
the attribute of supply disruption risk. 
Chaturvedi and Martinez-de-Albeniz (2011) first studied the order allocation 
problem under the optimal mechanism in the presence of disruption risk. They didn’t 
discuss the allocative efficiency of their mechanism. Similar to Chaturvedi and 
Martinez-de-Albeniz (2011), we also study the procurement mechanism design facing 
supply disruption risk, however, we focus on the efficient mechanism. 
As to efficient multi-attribute auction design problem, Parkes and Kalagnanam 
(2005) proposed an efficient descending multi-attribute reverse auction, assuming that 
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the buyer only buy one-unit product, the utility function is additive and the quality is 
discrete. They showed that the auction implements the one-side VCG (Vickrey-Clark-
Groves) auction. Xiang et al. (2018) studied the efficient procurement mechanism 
design facing supply disruption risk. The above two studies considered only one-unit 
case. Xu and Huang (2017) studied efficient multi-unit multi-attribute procurement 
mechanism design problem. They proposed a primal-dual Vickrey (PDV) auction 
which implements the one-side VCG.  
Our work is closely related to Xu and Huang (2017) and we study efficient multi-
unit multi-attribute procurement mechanism design considering supply disruption. But 
there are two distinctions: (1). The non-price attribute considered in our work is 
disruption risk which makes the supplies uncertain. The PDV auction in Xu and Huang 
(2017) can’t be used since it relies on the definition of over-demand set but this concept 
can’t be defined in our problem. (2). In Xu and Huang (2017), the non-price attributes 
don’t impact the quantity the buyers will get. So each supplier’s contribution to the 
system depends only on its own information and can be calculated by dual theory. Here 
the non-price attribute is supply disruption probability, which affects the quantity the 
buyer can get in the long run. Therefore, the dual method used in Xu and Huang (2017) 
can’t be used in our work. 
3. The Problem Setting
Consider a buyer who faces Q  unit demands, and wants to purchase products from a 
supplier pool (denoted by =N  with n=N ). The suppliers may be disrupted during 
their production or delivery process. The buyer will get revenue r  if it successfully 
sells one unit product. However, the buyer may get fewer products than the demand and 
this will incur shortage. Let the unit shortage cost be l . On the other hand, the buyer 
may also get more products than the demand and the leftover has zero salvage value. 
Suppose that the success probability attribute space A  has finite valuations, i.e., 
{ }1 2= , , , ma a a=A K . With different level of success probability, the production cost of 
each supplier is different. For example, if supplier i  produces with level j  success 
probability, i.e., its success probability is i jaρ = , the corresponding unit production 
cost of supplier i  is ( )i i jc f a= . In the auction, suppliers are requested to submit their
cost function if . Suppose that each supplier can only supply one unit. When a supplier 
has more than one unit, we can view the supplier as multi-agent supplier. 
5 
Suppose that the buyer will pay iw  to supplier i  when it successfully delivers one-
unit product to the buyer. Otherwise, if supplier i  is selected as a winner and it suffers 
disruption, the buyer will charge supplier i  pre-announced penalty p . Let ijq  be a 
binary variable which takes 1 if supplier i  is a winner and the j th level of success 
probability is chosen (i.e., i jaρ = ), and 0 otherwise (we will discuss later how to 
determine the values of iw  and ijq ). Let 
realQ   be the number of the products that the 
buyer actually gets (which is a random variable). The buyer’s expected payoff is 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
0
,
, ,
min , 1
1
real real
ij i i
i j
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(0.1) 
where ( ) ( ) ( )min ,real realU r Q Q l Q Q += × − −ρ,q  is the revenue function, M  denotes 
the index set of A , q  is the allocation matrix (if 1ijq = , it means supplier i  is a winner 
and the j th level of success probability is chosen), and ρ  is the corresponding success 
probability level vector (if 1ijq =  then i jaρ = , otherwise 0iρ = ). When q  is 
determined, ρ  is also determined. When supplier i  is the winner and the j th level of 
success probability is selected, its expected payoff is 
[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1i ij i i i i i ij i j i i jE q w p f q w a p f aρ ρΠ = − − − = − − − . (0.2) 
In this paper, we focus on efficient mechanism, which maximizes the total profit of 
the buyer and the supplier(s). A social efficient mechanism can help the buyer and its 
suppliers to achieve better cooperation and future development (Parkes and 
Kalagnanam, 2005; Xu and Huang, 2017). When the suppliers’ costs associating to 
each level of success probability are known to all, the social efficient allocation is the 
solution of the following optimization problem: 
( )
{ }
,
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. . 0,1 ,
1,
,
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i j
ij
j
ij
E U q c
s t i j
q i
q
∈ ∈
∈
⎡ ⎤
−⎢ ⎥
⎣ ⎦
∈ ∈∈  
≤  ∈
∑
∑
q
ρ,q N M
M
N MN (0.3) 
Note that, problem (0.3) is a stochastic programming since ( )U ρ,q  involves 
random variable realQ , and this makes the problem more complicated than the problem 
in Xu and Huang (2017), which is an 0-1 integer programming. Thus, methods like dual 
theory are not applicable to solve such problem. 
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Assumption 1. There are more than Q  suppliers satisfying ( ) 0i ir l cρ + − > . 
If otherwise, since ( )i ir l cρ + −  is the expected payoff brought by supplier i  when 
the buyer faces shortage, it is easy to show that it is optimal to select all such suppliers 
as winners. To rule out trivial case, we make this assumption. 
Let q  be a feasible solution of (0.3), qI is the corresponding winner set and 
= k=qI . The expected marginal profit corresponding to q  generated by supplier i  (
=i∈ qI ) is { } ( )1reali i i iMP p Q Q r l cρ−= ≤ − + −q , where realiQ−  denotes the real quantity of 
the product received by the buyer from other suppliers excepted supplier i . When 
k Q≤ , we have ( )i i iMP r l cρ= + − . Otherwise, we have ( )i i iMP r l cρ< + − . 
For supplier j  ( \j∈ qN I ), its expected marginal profit corresponding to q  is
{ } ( )1realj j jMP p Q Q r l cρ= ≤ − + −q , which is the profit difference of adding supplier j
in qI . 
We further define the substitutional marginal profit corresponding to q  of supplier 
j , \j∈ qN I  for supplier i∈ qI  as { } ( ), 1realj i i j j iSMP p Q Q r l c MPρ−= ≤ − + − −q , which 
is the profit change of removing supplier i  from qI  and adding supplier j  in qI . 
Theorem 1. *q  is an optimal solution of (0.3) if and only if 0iMP ≥  for *i∈ qI , 0jMP ≤  
for *i∈ qI , and , 0j iSMP ≤  for * *, \i j∈ ∈q qI N I . 
Proof. Without loss of generality, let supplier 1 to supplier k  are selected as winners. 
Therefore, the probability function of realQ  is given as follow: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
0
1 2
1
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
.
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k k
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k k k k
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k k
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p Q k k p
ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρ
= = = − − −
= = = − − + − − + + − −
= = =
LL L L LL L
 
And the expected revenue function is, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
1 2 1 2
0 1 1
1 2
+ 1 1
k Q Q Q k
k k k k k k
Q
k k k
E U r p p Qp Q p p p
l Qp Q p p
+ +
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = + + + + + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
− − + +
ρ,q L LL
Case 1, add one supplier, say supplier 1k +  
Then the probability function of realQ  is, 
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Then the expected revenue function is, 
( ) ( ) ( )
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By calculating the difference of the expected payoffs, we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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Thus, the marginal profit can be re-written as 
( )( ) ( ) { }0 1 2 11 1 1 1 11Q realk k k k k k k k k kr l p p p p c r l p Q Q c MPρ ρ−+ + + + +Δ = + + + + + − = + ≤ − − =L . 
When 1 0kMP + ≤  means that add supplier 1k +  is not profitable. 
Case 2, remove one supplier, say supplier j . Similarly, we could obtain that, 
( ) { }( )1realj j j jr l p Q Q c MPρ −Δ = − + ≤ − − = − . 
Then it means it is not profitable to remove any winner. 
Case 3, substitute one supplier, say supplier j  by supplier 1k + . Then the difference of 
profit between two cases is, 
( ) { }( ) ( ) { }( )
( )( ) { } ( )
( ) { }
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1
real real
k j k j j j
real
k j j k j
real
k j k j
r l p Q Q c r l p Q Q c
r l p Q Q c c
r l p Q Q c MP
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ
+ − + −
+ − +
+ − +
Δ = + ≤ − − − + ≤ − −
= − + ≤ − − −
= + ≤ − − −
It means not profitable to replace any winner by non-winner. Q.E.D. 
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Since realQ  is the sum of n  random variables, it is difficult to characterize the 
optimal solution. Note that { }1realip Q Q− ≤ − q  and { }1realp Q Q≤ − q  depend on other
winners’ disruption probabilities, so one supplier’s contribution to the system depends 
on other suppliers’ disruption probabilities. A popular way to solve stochastic 
programming is to develop heuristic algorithm (Patro et al., 2018), and Theorem 1 
allows us to construct such algorithm and accelerate it. 
4. The VCG Auction with Disruption Risk
In this section, we propose a mechanism to induce suppliers to reveal their information 
truthfully. To this end, we propose a procurement mechanism following the idea of 
Vickery-Clark-Groves auction (VCG-DR auction). The sequence of the events is: 
1. The buyer announces the auction rules:
a) The suppliers should bid their cost functions;
b) The order allocation rule is ( )1: , , nf fκ ʹ ʹ → qK , where if ʹ  is supplier i ’s bid 
and q  solves problem (0.3);
c) The payment to winning supplier i  is ( ) ( ) ( ): \i i iw f iψ ρʹ= +∏ −∏N N ; 
d) If a supplier is selected as a winner but it can’t deliver product to the buyer,
this supplier will pay p  to the buyer;
2. Supplier i  ( i∈N ) submits its bid if ʹ  by sealed format to the buyer; 
3. The buyer solves problem (0.3) and announces the winners. If 1ijq = , supplier i  is 
a winner with j th level is selected. We assume no transaction between suppliers;
4. Each winner produces the product, and delivers the product to the buyer if no
disruption happens. Otherwise, it has to pay p  to the buyer.
Similar to VCG mechanism, a winner’s payment in VCG-DR depends on the
supplier’s contribution. However, there are some distinctions between VCG-DR and 
traditional VCG mechanism. In VCG-DR, if a winner fails to deliver product to the 
buyer, it has to pay a penalty to the buyer. This case does not happen under traditional 
VCG mechanism. So our mechanism is a generalization of traditional VCG mechanism. 
Since we consider the case that the suppliers have private information on their costs and 
disruption probabilities, it is very difficult to compute a supplier’s contribution. 
Proposition 1 (Incentive Compatibility, IC). In the VCG-DR, truthful bidding is a 
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.  
Proof. Suppose that all suppliers except supplier i  bid their true information. We shall 
study supplier i ’s bidding strategy. When supplier i  bids ( ),i ic ρ  truthfully, the 
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corresponding allocation is q  and the corresponding supplier pool is N . The expected 
payoff of supplier i  (with j th success probability level) is 
( ) ( )( )1i ij i i iq w c pρΠ = − − − .
If otherwise, it bids ( ),i ic ρʹ , which is not its true information, the corresponding 
allocation is ʹq  and the corresponding supplier pool is ʹN . The expected payoff of 
supplier i  (with jʹ th success probability level) is 
( ) ( )( )1i ij i i iq w c pρʹʹ ʹ ʹΠ = − − − . 
We use contradiction to prove the theorem. If truth telling is not the dominate strategy 
for supplier i , there exists at least one bid ( ),i ic ρʹ  that i iʹΠ >Π . 
There are four possible cases: (a) 1ijq =  and 1ijq ʹʹ = ; (b) 0ijq =  and 1ijq ʹʹ = ; (c) 1ijq =  
and 0ijq ʹʹ = ; (d) 0ijq =  and 0ijq ʹʹ = . The last two cases are obviously none-profitable, 
thus we focus on the case (a) and (b). 
Case (a) In this case, supplier i  is the winner in both cases and we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
\ \
i i i i i i i i i i
i i
w c p w c p w w
i c i c
ρ ρʹ ʹ ʹΠ −Π = − − − − − + − = −
ʹ ʹ ʹ=Π −Π + −Π −Π −N N N N  
Note that ( ) ( )\ \i iʹΠ =ΠN N , then we have 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
\ , \ ,
0
i i i i
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t i s t i s
c c
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∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
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⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ρ,q ρ,qN M N M
N N N NThis contradicts the fact that q  maximize the social profit.  
Case (b) In this case, supplier i  is the not a winner when bid truthfully and it is a 
winner when cheating. Then we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
\ ,
\ ,
1 0 \ 1
1 \
1 \ 0
i i i i i i i i
ts t i
t i s
t
j i i i i
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i
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s
i
w c p i c c p
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U c q c p i
ρ ρ
ρ
ρ
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
ʹ
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⎛ ⎞
ʹ ʹ ʹ= − + − − −Π >⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑
∑
ρ,q
ρ,q
N M
N M
N N N
N
Note that supplier i  is the not a winner when bid truthfully, which means that
( ) ( ) ( )\ \i iʹΠ =Π =ΠN N N , then we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
\ ,
1
t i s
i ts t iU c q c pρ
∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞
ʹ ʹ− + > − +Π >Π⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ρ,q N M N N  
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This also contradicts the fact that q  maximize the social profit when all supplier bid 
truthfully. Thus the theorem is proved. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 indicates that the dominate strategy for suppliers is to bid their 
information truthfully in the VCG-DR. Similar to Xu and Huang (2017) and Parkes and 
Kalagnanam (2005), we extended the incentive compatibility to multi-attribute case. 
Proposition 2 (Individual rationality, IR). The VCG-DR mechanism is individual 
rational when p  is sufficient small. That is, the suppliers can get non-negative profits 
by participating in the auction. 
Proof. First, when supplier i  is not a winner, it gets zero profit. When supplier i  is 
selected as a winner, its payoff is ( )1i i i i i i iq w q p q cρΠ = − − − , by substituting the VCG-
DR payment iw , we get ( ) ( ) ( )= \ 1i i iq i pρΠ ⎡∏ −∏ − − ⎤⎣ ⎦N N , which is non-negative 
when p  is sufficient small. Thus suppliers get non-negative profits by participating in 
the VCG-DR. Q.E.D. 
Note that, the penalty is transaction payment between the buyer and suppliers, 
which doesn’t affect the incentive compatibility of the VCG-DR. Thus, the buyer could 
encourage suppliers to participate in the auction by setting 0p = . But there is risk that 
suppliers may cheat by reporting that the disruption happens without executing the 
contract. This won’t be a problem in some industries like the vaccine industry, since it 
is easy for the buyer to find out whether the suppliers have executed the contract or not. 
Another solution is to use asymmetric personalized penalty, for example, let the penalty 
to be certain ratio of the wholesale price that the buyer pays to the supplier.  
Proposition 3 (Efficiency). The VCG-DR is social efficient. 
Proof. Proposition 1 shows that all suppliers report their information truthfully, then the 
problem reduces to the case when all information are known to all. In the VCG-DR, the 
allocation rule is the solution of problem (0.3), which guarantees that the social welfare 
is the greatest. Thus, the proposition is proved. Q.E.D. 
The proposition indicates that the VCG-DR is social efficient, i.e., maximizing the 
total profit of the buyer and supplier. Different from Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) 
and Xu and Huang (2017), since the suppliers are not reliable, the buyer may get more 
or less than it order in the auction, which makes the problem more complicated and the 
results of these two works can not be applied to our problem. 
5. Performance Analysis
In this section, we compare performance of the VCG-DR with that of the widely 
used, Single-attribute Multi-unit Forward Vickrey with Reserved Attribute (SA-MFV) 
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(Xu & Huang, 2017). In SA-MFV, the buyer (or auctioneer) sets a reserved level for 
non-price attributes, and bidders (suppliers) compete on the wholesale price of the 
product and the wholesale price is the highest losing bid. Note that, when all suppliers 
are reliable and the buyer sets a reserved success probability as 1rρ = , the SA-MFV 
with reserved attribute reduces to the SA-MFV defined in Xu & Huang (2017). 
Lemma 1. For a given reserved success probability rρ , the equilibrium bidding 
strategy of supplier i  in SA-MFV is 
( ) ( ),i i r i rf fβ ρ ρ= . 
Proof. Suppose that supplier i  bids ( )i rf ρʹ  and the lowest losing bid is y . If 
( ) ( )i r i rf fρ ρʹ < , there is a positive probability that it generates negative profit (when 
( ) ( )i r i rf y fρ ρʹ < < , it wins and the profit is ( ) 0i ry f ρ− < ), and it’s not profitable to bid 
less than ( )i rf ρ . On the other hand, when supplier i  bids greater than ( )i rf ρ , its 
winning probability will decrease while its profit is unchanged (the payment is the 
lowest losing bid y  which is independent to the supplier i ’s bid) when it wins. Thus, 
it’s neither profitable to bid greater than ( )i rf ρ . The lemma is proved. Q.E.D. 
As a results, the real product received by the buyer realQ  follows the binomial 
distribution with parameter k  and rρ , where k  is the number of winners. And the 
probability function of realQ  is  
( ) ( ) ( ), 1i k ireal r r r
k
p Q i k
i
ρ ρ ρ
−⎛ ⎞
= = −⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
.  (5.1) 
Since all suppliers have the same success probability, the problem (0.3) is much 
easier to solve in this case. We need only rank all suppliers from the lowest to the 
highest by their costs they report. Then select the suppliers with lowest costs as winners 
sequentially, until all non-winners’ marginal expected profits are negative.  
Suppose that there are 10 potential suppliers and each supplier has 4 possible risk 
levels. The total demand faced by the buyer, 4Q = , the unit revenue for the buyer, 
20r = , and the unit shortage loss, 5l = . The penalty that a winner has to pay if it fails 
to deliver the product, 0.9p = . For SA-MFV, we consider 4 reserved success 
probabilities, i.e., 0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9rρ = . 
Figure 1 illustrates the total social welfare and the buyer’s profit incurred by VCG-
DR and SA-MFV with reserved attribute. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 1. The social profit and buyer’s profit 
From Figure 1, we find that VCG-DR outperforms SA-MFV with respect to 
efficiency and optimality. Also, we find that both the social profit and the buyer’s profit 
first increases and then decreases in reserved success probability. This means that with 
proper reserved success probability, the social welfare can be maximized. Too low or 
too high reliability requirement may hurt the social profit and the buyer’s profit. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2. The buyer’s payment and suppliers’ total profit 
Also, from Figure 2, we find that in SA-MFV, the buyer’s payment increases in 
reserved success probability. This means that if a buyer wants a high reliable supply, it 
should pay more. We also find that suppliers’ profit decreases first and then increases 
with respect to the reserved probability. Combining the results in Figure 1, we could 
conclude that a medium reserved success probability could increase the social welfare. 
However, the buyer exhausts the surplus and suppliers almost break even. 
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we considered a procurement problem when the suppliers may suffer 
disruption events. We proposed the Vickery-Clark-Groves auction with disruption risk 
(VCG-DR) to help the buyer to select suppliers and extended the procurement problem 
13 
to the multi-unit multi-attribute case. We demonstrated that the proposed mechanism 
achieves social efficiency and it is incentive compatible and individual rational. We 
compared the performance of the VCG-DR and the SA-MFV with reserved attribute by 
numerical experiments. The results show that the VCG-DR out-performs the SA-MFV 
with reserved attribute both in efficiency and optimality. 
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